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In a colloquium concentrating on the lower federal courts' jurisdiction to
determine federal claims, it falls to me to treat state court opportunities to
adjudicate the same issues in advance of, as an aid to, or in place of federal
litigation. To do that, I will have to recount some conventional wisdom regarding the development of federal habeas corpus and state postconviction
remedies in tandem during the last half century. In due course, I hope to
solicit support for an unconventional conclusion to be drawn from that
experience.
In my view, contemporary state postconviction remedies work such injury to federal interests that petitioners should not be required to invoke them.
I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, state postconviction remedies,
in partnership with judge-made doctrines restricting the availability of federal
habeas corpus, actually frustrate federal rights. Second, an insistence upon
state postconviction litigation partakes of the "process model" in federal jurisprudence-an explanation for the distribution of responsibility between the
state and federal courts that accords to the latter a residual role utterly at odds
with what is, or should be, our constitutional framework. I begin with the
options for postconviction litigation as they existed at one time and then track,
with occasional backing and filling, the unfortunate course of events that has
brought us to this pass.
* Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, University of Kansas;
LL.M. 1974, Harvard University. I would like to thank Jack Beermann, Maria Hylton, Ira C
Lupu, Tracey Maclin, Frances H. Miller, and Aviam Soifer for valuable comments on an earlier
draft. Suzy Taylor helped with research.
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INTRODUCTION

Forty years ago, when Fred Vinson presided in Washington and Edward
Levi was an obscure academic at the University of Chicago, the Supreme
Court decided Young v. Ragen,1 one of those recurrent little cases packing an
enormous practical and theoretical wallop. Habeas corpus aficionados and

Dean Levi, who served as counsel for the petitioner, will recall that Jack
Young was convicted of burglary and larceny by an Illinois circuit court and
was sentenced to a term in prison.2 A year later, he filed a habeas corpus
petition in state court, alleging among other things that the guilty plea entered
against him in the trial court had been involuntary and thus invalid under the
fourteenth amendment. 3 The state's attorney conceded that Young's allegations were substantial and that he was entitled to a hearing.4 Yet the circuit

court dismissed summarily, ostensibly on the ground that habeas corpus was
not available in Illinois to test the validity of a criminal conviction on constitutional grounds.5 Nor could Young raise his claim on writ of error or coram
nobis.6 To make matters worse, the Illinois appellate courts had no appellate
jurisdiction to review denials of habeas relief. In the end, it appeared that
there was no mechanism at all within the state court system by which Young,
or prisoners like him,7 could raise what might be meritorious federal

contentions. 8

The occasion was momentous. Notwithstanding the Court's rejection of
Justice Black's "incorporation" theory several years earlier,9 most of the Justices then sitting were poised to effect improvements in state criminal
processes by forcing the states to conform to federal constitutional standards.
Already the Court had agreed to examine the "totality of facts" 1 in each
instance to ensure that state procedures were "fundamentally fair."'" A few
1. 337 U.S. 235 (1948).
2. Id. at 237.
3. Levi's brief in the Supreme Court recited the allegations in the habeas petition below:
that Young and his wife had been arrested without a warrant, that they had been held "incommunicado" for fifteen days, that they had been subjected to "abuse and torment," that Young's
request for counsel had been denied, and that he had stood mute before the trial court and had
not voluntarily agreed to the plea entered on his behalf. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Young, 337
U.S. 235 (1948).
4. Young, 337 U.S. at 237.
5. The circuit court explained only that Young's petition was "insufficient in law and substance." Id. at 237. The state Attorney General took that explanation to mean that, as a state
procedural matter, habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy for Young's claim. Other
circuit court decisions in Illinois were consistent with that understanding. Id.
6. At any rate, the state Attorney General did not "suggest that either of the other two
Illinois post-trial remedies, writ of error or coram nobis, [was] appropriate." Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
7. Young's case was consolidated in the Supreme Court with several similar cases. Id. at
239.
8. Id. at 234.
9. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1947).
10. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
11. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
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years later, the Warren Court would demand that "fundamental" procedural
safeguards recognized in the Bill of Rights be respected in state as well as
federal prosecutions.12 Simultaneously, the Court was grooming the lower
federal courts to assume the primary burden for the enforcement of constitutional rights in federal court. Well before the decision in Young, the Court
had established that district courts would issue the federal writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of state prisoners whose convictions were obtained in violation of federal law. 3 Five years after Young, in Brown v. Allen,14 the Court
would underscore the availability of the federal habeas courts to guarantee
compliance with federal standards."
By common account, both the Court's innovations in substantive constitutional law and its development of federal habeas corpus to provide federal
enforcement machinery reflected dismay over the arbitrary, even brutal, handling of criminal defendants by state authorities.1 6 At the same time, however, the Court was trying desperately to obtain the cooperation of the state
courts in the new federal order. A year earlier, the Court had read the
supremacy clause to require state court enforcement of a valid federal statute
despite its penal character.17 And, in a series of criminal cases from Illinois
culminating in Young, the Court had become increasingly distressed by state
procedural complexities that seemed invariably to thwart the consideration of
constitutional claims in state court.1 8 In case after case, prisoners attempted
to follow the procedural advice provided by the Illinois Supreme Court's most
recent rulings. But, in case after case, that court concluded that the wrong
writ had been chosen. In each instance, the United States Supreme Court
found such state procedural grounds of decision to be sufficient.1 9 Yet patience with common law formalisms was wearing thin. The Justices had recently warned that the state courts' refusal to address federal constitutional
12. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. Eg., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).

14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
15. Compare Bator, Finalityin CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prison-

ers, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963)(contending that Brown extended the federal habeas jurisdiction well beyond what it had been in the past) with Peller, In Defense ofFederalHabeasCorpus
Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982) (arguing thatBrown only reaffirmed jurisdictional power that had existed for some time).
16. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Compare Developments in the LawFederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1055-62 (1970) (explaining the expansion of
federal habeas as the product of the Court's desire to offer at least one opportunity to litigate

federal claims in a federal forum).

17. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947). See infra text accompanying notes 133-35.

18. See Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1945); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947); Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1947).
19. E.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 179 (1946) (accepting that the writ of error was
inappropriate); Woods, 328 U.S. 216 (accepting the explanation that the petitioner had chosen

the wrong writ-habeas corpus).
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claims might itself constitute a due process violation.2 0

In Young, accordingly, Chief Justice Vinson faced a vital choice. On the
one hand, it was perfectly open to him to wash his hands of the state courts
and their vexing processes and to reach and resolve Young's federal claim.

That would have been wholly consistent with the Court's growing willingness
to measure state criminal process against federal constitutional standards. If

the claim could not be determined without an evidentiary hearing, Vinson
might have dismissed for that reason, without prejudice to a federal habeas
corpus action in which a federal district court would take evidence, find the
relevant facts, and dispose of the claim on the merits. Moreover, channeling
constitutional litigation to the federal habeas courts would have accorded with
the Justices' increasing recognition that the Supreme Court itself could not

always correct errors in state criminal cases and that the lower federal courts,
exercising their jurisdiction in habeas, could serve as surrogates. Clearly, the
"adequate state ground" doctrine posed no bar this time around. Illinois was
free to choose the state procedural vehicle it wished prisoners to employ. If

the circuit court had dismissed Young's action because he had pursued habeas
corpus, as opposed to some other "clearly defined method" for pressing his
federal claim, Vinson would have affirmed on that nonfederal basis. In this
instance, however, Illinois offered "no post-trial remedy" at all to prisoners in
Young's position. That state of affairs could provide no "adequate" state pro-

cedural ground of decision on which the circuit court's judgment could rest. 2'

On the other hand, it was open to Vinson once more to exhort state authorities in Illinois to make the state courts available, by some means, for the
treatment of Young's federal claim. That is the course the Chief Justice chose
to follow. He vacated the circuit court order below and remanded for reconsideration.2 2 No one dissented. There was reason to hope that something
good might happen on remand. At the time, the Illinois Supreme Court had
20. A notation by Justice Frankfurter for the Court in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139
(1947), was oblique in this respect. It is possible to read his reference to the denial of corrective
process in state court as a suggestion that, in the future, the Court would find such a ground of
decision inadequate to cut off review on certiorari. More likely, Frankfurter intended to indicate that there are some occasions on which state postconviction remedies must be available.
See infra text accompanying note 135.
21. Of course, an affirmance on an "adequate and independent state ground" would not
have prejudiced a later petition for federal habeas relief-at least in 1948. House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42 (1945); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-31 (1963). More recent decisions make it
difficult for prisoners to avoid dismissal in habeas on the basis of procedural default in state
court if their defaults were, or would be, sufficient to abrogate direct Supreme Court review.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-21. Yet it is important to distinguish a denial of review
in favor of fact-finding in a federal district court from an affirmance on the basis of "adequate"
state grounds. Cf. Grace v. California, 360 U.S. 940 (1959) (denying certiorari "without prejudice to an application for writ of habeas corpus in an appropriate United States District
Court"). In the former instance, the Court makes no public judgment regarding the procedures
in state court and may well wish only to direct the litigant to a federal court able to provide a
needed evidentiary hearing. Cf. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764-65 (1945).
22. Young, 337 U.S. at 240.
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begun to widen the scope of state habeas corpus.' Even though some circuit
courts had continued to dismiss postconviction petitions, it was at least possible that those trial-level courts had not been apprised of the state supreme
court's change of heart.2 4 Vinson's disposition was, then, entirely understandable and in keeping with the Supreme Court's practice of avoiding confrontations with the state courts whenever possible. Indeed, the decision in Young
was admirably sensitive, measured and pragmatic. I mean in this essay to
show that it was also dead wrong.
Two mistakes were made in Young. First, on a practical level, the Court
signaled Illinois and other states to establish general state postconviction remedies for the litigation of federal claims raised after the completion of the ordinary appellate process. In Part I, I trace the development of state
postconviction remedies since Young and examine the role they have come to
play at present. That history has not been happy. Notwithstanding the best of
intentions on the part of proponents, and despite the possibilities that surely
existed, the states have established and now employ postconviction remedies
that all too often frustrate the adjudication of federal claims. Accordingly, I
contend that petitioners should be relieved of any responsibility to pursue
those remedies before seeking federal habeas relief.
Second, on a conceptual level, the Court in Young lent credence to what
is conventionally called the "process model" in American jurisprudence. At
its core, the process model contemplates that the substantive conclusions of
governmental institutions should be accepted on the whole, unless the process
by which those outcomes were generated is found to be flawed in a manner
that undercuts their political legitimacy or accuracy. In Part II, I elaborate on
the process model more fully and explore its implications in this context. The
appraisal is not sympathetic. As applied to the allocation of responsibility and
authority between the federal and state courts, the process model fails to appreciate the value of ensuring that litigants with federal claims have at least
one fair opportunity to litigate those claims in a federal forum. Accordingly, I
contend on this more fundamental ground that state postconviction remedies
should be optional.
I.
STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND

How

THEY GREW

The circumstances in Young presented a narrow constitutional question:

whether the states are obligated to offer criminal defendants a collateral opportunity to litigate federal claims that by their nature cannot be determined
at trial or on direct review.2 5 Three (overlapping) possibilities suggest them23. Id. at 237 (citing People v. Loftus, 400 I. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948); People v.
Shoffner, 400 II1. 174, 79 N.E.2d 200 (1948); People v. Wilson, 399 I. 437, 78 N.E.2d 514
(1948)).
24. Id. at 237, 239-40.

25. Id. at 238-39.
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selves: claims touching the appellate court's handling of an appeal; claims
depending upon new, but retroactively applicable, propositions of federal law;
and claims depending upon factual allegations that could not have been raised
at trial or on direct review. Of these, the third is by far the most significant
inasmuch as it includes a variety of constitutional grounds for relief. In
Young, for example, the petitioner was said to have pleaded guilty as charged,
aborting trial and appeal altogether, and thus had to pursue some postconviction remedy-or nothing.2 6 I will return to the states' constitutional responsibilities in cases of that kind.2 7
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion suggested, however, more sweeping remedies to accommodate litigants whose claims are raised as a matter of fact, not
logic, after direct review is complete. Some such petitioners failed to raise
claims when they might have and subsequently must insist that their procedural defaults should be excused. Others raised their claims in season but now
present new allegations of fact that arguably put the matter in a different light.
Whether or not the states must establish state remedies for defaulting petitioners, there were intimations aplenty when the Court decided Young that such
remedies should be adopted to keep pace with the federal habeas courts, which
would be open to adjudicate federal claims notwithstanding procedural defaults in state court. Some states had already begun to experiment with remedies capable of meeting demands for postconviction adjudication. Vinson's
opinion fueled movements of that kind, generating widespread expectations
that the states would provide for postconviction litigation of federal claims
that were not, but might have been, adjudicated at trial or on direct review.
A.

The Common Law Writs

In a sizeable number of jurisdictions, state appellate courts initially attempted to refurbish two common law writs for the new duty-habeas corpus
and coram nobis. The intuitively more likely candidate of the two, habeas
corpus, paradoxically presented greater difficulty. To begin, the common law
rule governing habeas in most jurisdictions, including Illinois,2 8 limited petitioners challenging detention under court order, as opposed to executive custody, to attacks on the sentencing court's jurisdiction. 29 The Supreme Court
had recently faced the same difficulty with respect to the federal habeas writ.
At first, the Court had indulged the fiction that constitutional error in a criminal conviction robbed the court concerned of jurisdiction; later, the Court
26. Id. at 237-38.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 129-37.
28. See, eg., Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-] 776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 262
(1965); Collings, Habeas Corpusfor Convicts-ConstitutionalRight orLegislative Grace? 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337-38 (1952).
29. See Granucci, Review of CriminalConvictions by Habeas Corpusin California, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 189, 192 (1963); Comment, The Use of Habeas Corpus for Collateral Attacks on
CriminalJudgments, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 420, 421-22 (1948); Wilkes, Post-Conviction Habeas
Corpus Relief in Georgia: A Decade After the Habeas Corpus Act, 12 GA. L. REV. 249, 250
(1978).
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abandoned references to jurisdiction entirely and held forthrightly that convictions were open to collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings.30 Some
state courts followed suit--often for the express purpose of providing state
31
court process in the hope of avoiding litigation in the federal forum.
Nevertheless, other formalisms associated with habeas at common law
typically barred convicts from the state writ. Even in jurisdictions in which
nonjurisdictional claims were now cognizable, state courts insisted that habeas
remained a "supplementary" remedy, not a "substitute for appeal."3 2 Procedural irregularities making criminal judgments "voidable" constituted "mere
error" subject to correction only on direct review.33 By contrast, postconviction habeas corpus was restricted to more fundamental defects rendering convictions entirely "void." 4 There were other obstacles as well.3 5 While some
states gradually relaxed such barriers, 6 others maintained them intact-seriously undercutting the utility of habeas corpus as a routinely available vehicle
for postconviction litigation in state court.3 7
Coram nobis was free of at least some of the disabilities associated with
habeas corpus, 38 but it had drawbacks of its own as a postconviction remedy
for claims that might have been raised in prior proceedings. Developed at
common law to complement the writ of error, by which the record at trial
could be removed to a higher court for the consideration of questions of law,
coram nobis was available in the trial court-but only for the assertion of
30. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (employing the fiction) with
Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (discarding it).
31. E.g., Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283, 251 P.2d 87 (1952). See also ExparteSeeley,
29 Cal. 2d 294, 176 P.2d 24 (1946); Ex parte McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946);
Comment, supra note 29.
32. E.g., Harrison v. Amrine, 155 Kan. 186, 124 P.2d 202 (1942); accord Morris v. Peacock, 202 Ga. 524, 43 S.E.2d 531, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 832 (1947). See Note, State PostConviction Remedies and FederalHabeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 161 (1965) (describing the sense in which many state courts understood habeas to be a "supplementary" remedy
only).
33. Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 916, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941).
34. In re Shaffer, 70 Mont. 609, 227 P. 37 (1924).
35. For example, since only prisoners in physical detention could seek habeas relief, petitioners seeking to challenge sentences before their incarceration were ineligible to apply. Eg.,
In re Rosencrantz, 205 Cal. 534, 271 P. 902 (1928). And, since habeas applications could be
filed only in the immediate vicinity of a petitioner's place of detention, courts situated near
penal institutions could be swamped with prisoner petitions, while sentencing courts, with more
convenient access to records and witnesses, handled other judicial business. Sce People ex rel.
Latham v. Warden, 39 A.D.2d 660, 331 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1972) (explaining this impediment to
effective postconviction habeas in New York State).
36. E.g., In re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954) (permitting a petitioner to
attack the second of two consecutive sentences while serving the first).
37. See Note, supra note 32.
38. Coram nobis had long been available after trial in criminal cases and, indeed, had been
developed as a vehicle for the correction of judgments in an era that recognized no post-trial
motions. Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMPLE L.Q. 365, 366-70 (1929).
There was no requirement that coram nobis applicants be in custody. Eg., State ex rel. Lopez
v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1930). Petitions were properly filed in the trial court
that imposed the sentence. Eg., People v. Wurzler, 300 N.Y. 344, 90 N.E.2d 886 (1950).
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matters of fact outside the record.39 If the applicant's allegations had been

considered at trial, or through the exercise of diligence might have been so
considered, coram nobis was unavailable. Indeed, even if petitioners were able

to allege mistakes of fact that the trial court, in ignorance, could not have
avoided, relief was available only if the truth, if known previously, would have
prevented the judgment against the applicant. 40 Some states overcame these

shortcomings.41 Yet others could not, and in the end, the capacity of coram
nobis to serve as a general postconviction remedy for federal claims was much
in d6ubt in most jurisdictions.
For some time, state courts across the country struggled with their tasksome choosing habeas, others coram nobis, to shape into something serviceable. Usually, coram nobis won out.4 2 In due course, however, the efforts of
state courts to fashion either writ into an effective postconviction vehicle gave

way to legislative decisions to establish new statutory remedies. These new
remedies, typically in the nature of coram nobis, superseded the development

of the common law writs-which soon were relegated to the fringes of postconviction practice or abandoned altogether.4 3
B.

Statutory Remedies

Illinois, whose "merry-go-round" of postconviction writs had prompted

so much attention in the Supreme Court,' produced the first legislative action. Initially, the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations formed a spe-

cial joint committee, chaired by Albert Jenner, which proposed a new court

rule providing for postconviction litigation.4 5 The state supreme court declined to adopt the proposed new rule, apparently because it was impermissi-

bly legislative in character, but the state legislature put it in the form of a bill

and promptly enacted it into statutory law.46 The Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act47 was by all accounts an attempt to resolve the problems that had
39. E.g., Fugate v. State, 85 Miss. 94, 37 So. 554 (1904).
40. E.g., Maynard v. Downer, 13 Wend. 575 (1835); People v. Touhy, 397 I11. 19, 72
N.E.2d 827 (1947); State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 231 N.W.2d 345 (1975).
41. The leading case is Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882). See generally E. FRANK,
CORAM NoBIs (1953); Thornton, Coram Nobis Et Coram Vobis, 5 IND. L.J. 603 (1930); Orfield,
Applicability of Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Nebraska, 10 NEB. L. BULL. 314 (1932).
42. Note, PostreleaseRemedies for Wrongful Conviction, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1623
(1961). For example, coram nobis won out in New York. Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47
N.E.2d 425 (1943); In re Morhous v. N.Y. Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79 (1943).
Cf. New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688 (1943) (remanding to permit the New
York courts to decide which writ was appropriate for postconviction litigation). See generally
Cohen, Post-ConvictionRelief in the New York Court of Appeals: New Wine and Broken Bottles,
35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1968).
43. E.g., People ex rel. Russell v. LeFevre, 59 A.D.2d 588, 397 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1977) (explaining that postconviction habeas corpus is now available in New York only if the petitioner
shows that the statutory remedy is inadequate).
44. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
45. Jenner, The Illinois Post-Conviction HearingAct, 9 F.R.D. 347, 357 (1950).
46. Id.
47. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, H.S. 826-32 (1949) (repealed 1964).
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vexed state courts forced to make do with the common law writs and, on its

face, offered a significant improvement upon them.48 Indeed, the Illinois stat-

ute became the model for a uniform act, published by the American Law Insti49
tute's National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Within a few years, most states adopted new statutory remedies of their own.' °
On close examination, however, the Illinois remedy and statutory procedures like it in other states were riddled with holes through which meritorious

federal claims might fall. By the express terms of the Illinois law, for example,
only prisoners actually incarcerated in the state penitentiary were eligible to

invoke the new remedy. Petitioners who qualified to apply for relief were required to do so within five years after conviction-unless the delay could not
be ascribed to the petitioner's "culpable negligence." In addition, and despite

prisoners' acknowledged need for professional assistance, the statute provided
for the appointment of counsel for indigents only after an application raising a

substantial claim was filed. In 1968, the American Bar Association's Advisory
Committee on Sentencing and Review, chaired by Simon Sobeloff and advised
by Curtis Reitz, drafted guidelines suggesting improvements on the Illinois
model. 5 ' Those guidelines were incorporated into the now familiar ABA

Standards for Criminal Justice-Postconviction Remedies.5"
The most significant shortcoming in the new state postconviction remedies was their inhospitality to claims that were not, but might have been, determined at trial or on direct review.53 Just how significant that limitation was
48. In theory, the statutory remedy in Illinois did not displace any of the writs previously
employed in postconviction litigation, all of which remained available within their own obscure
spheres. In practice, however, the statutory remedy soon consolidated most applications for
collateral relief. Applicants wishing to challenge their criminal convictions on federal constitutional grounds were permitted to file petitions in the most convenient forum (the court in which
the conviction was obtained), and the state official in the best position to respond (the local
prosecutor) was required to answer. Flexible fact-finding procedures, including evidentiary
hearings, were established, and decisions were made reviewable on writ of error. See id.
49. Note, The Uniform Post-Conviction ProcedureAct, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1289-90
(1956).
50. A few states enacted statutes tracking 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was enacted by Congress as part of the general revision of the Judicial Code in 1948. That new section permitted
petitioners attacking federal criminal judgments to file "motions to vacate sentence" in the sentencing district as substitutes for habeas petitions in the district of confinement. See generally
Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code. The Threatened Demise of Habeas Corpus, 59 YALE
L.J. 1183 (1960).
51. ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEv, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVCTION REMEDIES (1968) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS (1968 version)].
See, e-g., id. § 2.3 at 40-45 (advising against a "custody requirement"); § 2.4 at 45-48 (opposing
a statute of limitations as a bar to postconviction relief); and § 4.4 at 64-67 (emphasizing the
need for assigned counsel in postconviction proceedings).
52. See PostconvictionRemedies, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ch. 22 (1982)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS (1982 version)].
53. People v. Dale, 406 Il1. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950). See United States ex rel.Touhy v.
Ragen, 224 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1955); United States ex rel. Barksdale v. Sielaff, 585 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1978). The Illinois remedy
could not be used to obtain reconsideration of claims determined previously. People v.
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then, and remains today, becomes clear in the interplay between state postcon-

viction remedies and federal habeas. That is the subject to which I now turn.
C. State Remedies and FederalHabeas

Once state postconviction remedies were installed in most jurisdictions,
they had a telling impact upon the work of the lower federal courts exercising
their jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners. In

this section, I examine three aspects of federal habeas practice in which state
postconviction remedies have come to play a significant, and I think undesirable, role: the exhaustion doctrine, fact-finding, and the effect of procedural
default in state court. Indeed, the relationship between and among these ele-

ments of habeas corpus lore exacerbates the pernicious effects of any requirement that prisoners pursue postconviction litigation in state court.
1.

The Exhaustion Doctrine

It is common currency that federal habeas corpus petitioners attacking
custody in the hands of state authorities first are expected to exhaust any effective remedy available in the courts of the state concerned. 4 The exhaustion

doctrine is not jurisdictional, but a matter of comity between the federal and
state judicial systems." Yet with few exceptions, the Supreme Court has insisted upon exhaustion as a condition precedent to the availability of the federal forum. 6
The case for exhaustion is most powerful when criminal defendants seek
57
federal habeas relief while trial proceedings are pending in state court.

Habeas relief at that stage would disrupt orderly state proceedings much in
the fashion of injunctions5 8 or pre-trial removal. 9 Exhaustion is also expected, however, when trial-level courts have completed their work and the
state appellate courts stand ready to entertain claims of federal error. After
Bernovich, 403 Ill. 480, 87 N.E.2d 609 (1949); People v. Marino, 404 I1. 37, 88 N.E.2d 8
(1949).
54. See generally Developments, supra note 16, at 1093-103. The expectation that state
judicialremedies must be exhausted complements the understanding that federal habeas corpus
is a statutory exception to the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982),
which ordinarily instructs the federal courts to accord state court judgments the preclusive
effect they would have in the state concerned.
55. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
56. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).
57. E.g., Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (the progenitor case).
58. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
59. See Greenwood v. Peacock, 394 U.S. 808 (1966). Cf. Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutions Affecting FederallyGuaranteed CivilRights: FederalRemoval and HabeasCorpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965) (arguingfor pre-trial habeas and
removal in certain civil rights contexts but recognizing the similar impact of either on state
criminal prosecutions). There are, to be sure, instances in which petitioners contend that trial
in state court would itself be unconstitutional, such that habeas should be available earlierprovided that state pre-trial remedies are exhausted. E.g., Justices of Boston Municipal Court
v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984) (involving a double jeopardy claim). My focus here, however, is
on the impact of state postconviction remedies on the exhaustion doctrine.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1987-88]

STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES

trial, to be sure, the risk of disrupting state adjudicatory machinery is mini-

mal. The exhaustion of state appellate remedies is demanded for an additional
reason: to involve the state appellate courts in the development of federal law.

Convicts are asked, accordingly, to put their federal claims before the highest
state court empowered to hear such contentions.6' This is hardly surprising,
given that state appellate review is the straightforward means by which state
courts can treat federal claims in light of the record at trial and the legal
arguments presented in brief.6
State postconviction remedies collateral to trial and appeal cut their own
figure in this pattern. On the one hand, there are many instances in which the

mere existence of such remedies has no effect on petitioners' obligations under
the exhaustion doctrine. If, for example, a petitioner raises a purely legal
claim, depending entirely upon facts developed at trial, an appeal to the appro-

priate state appellate court will suffice. It is unnecessary in such a case "to ask
the state for collateral relief, based on the same evidence and issues already

decided by direct review."62 In numerous other instances, on the other hand,
the exhaustion doctrine, as it is currently understood, contemplates the employment of state postconviction remedies. If, for example, a petitioner neglected appeal entirely,63 or failed to press on appeal the claim sought to be
raised in federal habeas,' resort to state postconviction remedies is expected

in order to provide the state courts with one fair opportunity to treat the
60. The identification of such a court can be difficult inasmuch as many states now sever
their most authoritative courts from ordinary appellate practice after the pattern of the Supreme
Court of the United States. If appeal lies to a court as a matter of right, it is clear that petitioners must ordinarily seek appellate review there to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine. Meeks v.
Jago, 548 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977). If, however, a court
enjoys discretion under state law to accept only cases of special significance, petitioners' obligations are less clear. Compare Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
Georgia Supreme Court's jurisdiction is sufficiently circumscribed to make it unnecessary to
apply there for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine) with Richardson
v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring Texas petitioners to seek discretionary
review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).
61. I acknowledge, but put to one side, the possibility that federal claims can be presented
to the trial court by post-trial motion, such as an application for new trial.
62. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953). Indeed, even this statement of the law, read
literally, asks too much of the petitioner. So long as the claim is presented in the appropriate
fashion on direct review, and so long as it is identified clearly to the appellate court, the exhaustion doctrine is satisfied even if the court ignores the claim, Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332
(1978), or refuses to address it on procedural grounds, Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
The working idea is that the state court should be allowed a fair opportunity to address the
petitioner's federal contentions, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), not that the court
must seize such an opportunity to reach the merits. Certainly, petitioners cannot force state
courts to take their claims seriously. See generally Castille v. Peoples, 57 U.S.LW. 4249 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 1989).
63. Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 282 (2d Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Crist, 647 F.2d 956, 957
(9th Cir. 1981).
64. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981) (explaining that a petitioner had failed to
raise his federal claim on appeal but had put it forward in state postconviction proceedings and
in that way satisfied the exhaustion doctrine).
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For the same reason, petitioners are required to seek reconsideration

of federal claims in state court if, because of an interim change 66in federal law,
the state courts might treat the claim differently on rehearing.

Commonly, moreover, the claims petitioners wish to litigate in the federal
forum simply rest upon factual allegations outside the state court record. The
exhaustion doctrine ordinarily contemplates use of state postconviction remedies prior to federal habeas where, after state appeal, petitioners raise factbound constitutional claims that either were omitted altogether from the ap-

pellate briefs or were considered without benefit of evidence discovered after
the state appellate court denied relief.67 Into this category fall many constitu-

tional claims, including all-important allegations that defense counsel's representation, evidenced by facts outside the formal record, was constitutionally

deficient. 8 If relief is denied at the trial level in state postconviction proceedings, petitioners must seek review in the state appellate courts. 69 In cases in
which a petitioner's postconviction allegations make out new and different federal claims, the state appellate courts may then consider those claims for the

first time;7" in cases in which the applicant's claims were before the appellate
courts on direct review, albeit without benefit of newly discovered facts, the
appellate courts may see the claims differently in light of the embellished
record.7 '
At first blush, the occasions on which the exhaustion doctrine calls on
would-be federal habeas petitioners to exhaust state postconviction remedies
may seem justifiable. For by now we are accustomed to the practice of identi-

65. E.g., Drake v. Wyrick, 640 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1981).
66. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). See Comment, Habeas Corpus-Effect of
Supreme Court Change in Law on Exhaustion of State Remedies Requisite to Federal Habeas
Corpus, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1303 (1965). But see Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967)
(finding it unnecessary to return to state court on account of more favorable state court decisions on point). Indeed, even if the applicable federal standard has not changed since a claim
was raised on direct review, the petitioner may be required to exhaust state postconviction
remedies if the documentary record before the state appellate court was incomplete, such that
the state court was deprived of materials essential to proper adjudication. See, e.g., Needel v.
Scafati, 412 F.2d 761 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969); Joyner v. Swenson, 254 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D. Mo. 1966); United States ex rel. Boodie v. Herold, 349 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.
1965).
67. Tyler v. Wyrick, 730 F.2d 1209, 1210 (8th Cir. 1984); Isaac v. Perrin, 659 F.2d 279,
281 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981); Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
68. E.g., Rodriguez v. McKaskle, 724 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Rodriguez
v. Procunier, 460 U.S. 1039 (1984); Burns v. Estelle, 695 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1983).
69. Domaingue v. Butterworth, 641 F.2d 8 (Ist Cir. 1981); Reynolds v. Wainwright, 460
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 34 (1972). Cf. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 415 n.5
(1981) (explaining that a petitioner had appealed from the denial of state postconviction relief).
70. See Horowitz v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1983) (insisting that a petitioner complete an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief); Piercy v. Parratt, 579 F.2d
470, 473 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). Cf. Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S. 412 (1943) (insisting upon an
appeal from an unsuccessful coram nobis petition at the trial level in state court).
71. Brown v. Crouse, 395 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1968). But see Wood v. Crouse, 389 F.2d
747 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 399 U.S. 520 (1970) (finding it unnecessary to
appeal when the claim had been treated on direct review in the first instance and trial-level
postconviction proceedings had not altered the record).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1987-88]

STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES

fying issues that have not clearly been put to the state courts, ascertaining that
some state postconviction remedy provides a formal vehicle for presenting
those matters, and then refusing access to federal habeas corpus until that
opportunity for state court litigation is exhausted. Yet it is vital to recognize
that this pattern is founded upon the existence of state postconviction remedies, which do not merely add an additional layer of state court litigation to
petitioners' obligations under the exhaustion doctrine, but create myriad opportunities for forcing them into state court litigation of doubtful substantive
value. My reading of the cases convinces me that (some) state's attorneys
searching for easy exits from federal habeas proceedings, and (some) federal
magistrates and district judges hoping to dispose of potentially meritorious
habeas applications without a hearing, seize upon the formal availability of
state postconviction remedies to justify summary dismissal in a range of cases
in which prompt federal treatment of the merits is appropriate. In theory, of
course, exhaustion dismissals simply postpone federal habeas adjudication. In
practice, however, dismissals on this basis may entirely discourage undereducated prison inmates who find themselves exhausted before they are able to
plumb state postconviction remedies to the bottom.7'
To understand how this can be so, one need only reflect on the nature of
the constitutional claims that typically arise in criminal cases. Those claims
are rarely pristine legal arguments. They are sensitive to factual context, as
well as to the state of decisional law at the time they are examined. Initially,
then, it is often difficult to say with confidence whether a claim was presented
to the state courts and whether, if it was, it was framed for those courts in the
best possible way. In cases in which it is clear that a claim was not raised at
trial or on direct review, it is often difficult to distinguish petitioners like Jack
Young, who, by hypothesis, committed no default and plainly are entitled to
pursue state postconviction relief, from others who did commit default by failing to raise claims earlier and thus may be barred from state postconviction
proceedings. Even applicants in the latter category, moreover, may be able to
satisfy stringent state standards for escaping dismissal for procedural default.
Whether they can, in turn, is a matter for the state courts.
In many instances, then, it is plausible for a busy state's attorney to insist
upon further state postconviction litigation as opposed to immediate federal
adjudication. The slightest change in circumstances since the petitioner's previous appearance in state court provides an opening for an argument that the
state courts might yet hear a claim in postconviction proceedings. This is not
72. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled on other

grounds, Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). In this vein, it should be noted that the
processing of state postconviction petitions is often painfully slow. Extraordinary delay can
lead, of course, to the conclusion that a state remedy is not "available" at all within the meaning
of the exhaustion doctrine. E.g., Mucie v. Missouri State Dept. of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633
(8th Cir. 1976). In most instances, however, the federal habeas courts have proved to be most

patient-indulging the state courts while sacrificing petitioners' interests in expeditious adjudication. E.g., Cook v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 749 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1985).
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to resurrect the silly argument, put forward by Judge John J. Parker, that
federal habeas corpus treatment of federal claims is never timely-it always
being true that a disappointed prisoner nonetheless remains free again and

again to press the state courts to adjudicate federal claims."' Yet the formal
availability of state postconviction remedies to address subtle variations in fed-

eral claims does present a real threat to the enforcement of the Constitution in
the federal forum.
Ordinary due process claims depending upon the "totality of facts" in a
case7 4 and ineffective assistance claims based upon the entirety of counsel's
performance75 are rife with opportunities for insisting upon further postconviction litigation in state court. Petitioners filing federal habeas petitions often
rely in some measure upon recitations of fact not plainly presented to the state
courts. Another trip to state court may be plausible when additional allega-

tions significantly alter the nature and power of the claim. Yet the recent
flood of decisions channeling prisoners back to state court is wholly
unjustified.7 6

The extraordinary rigidity with which the exhaustion doctrine is employed these days is, of course, primarily to blame for this sorry state of affairs. I have argued elsewhere that exhaustion should be relaxed into a
discretionary authority, lodged with the district courts, to require further liti-

gation in state court when the circumstances in individual cases indicate that
it is reasonable to postpone federal adjudication." Without abandoning that
73. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176 (1948). In spite of
Judge Parker's assertions, it is well settled that petitioners need not redundantly press the state
courts to change their minds. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 448 n.3 (1953).
74. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
76. I wish I could read Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), to signal an end to this
pattern. But Justice Marshall's comments for the Court in that case were too careful and confined to stem the tide of so many lower court decisions, which reflect the contradictory sentiments of other members of the Court. In Hillery, the district court had taken the initiative
under Rule 7 of the federal habeas rules. The petitioner was directed to expand the record
regarding his race discrimination claim by adducing statistical evidence. The new information
produced in that way was largely cumulative. Even at that, Justice Marshall explicitly set to
one side the appropriate disposition of any case in which a habeas petitioner "has attempted to
expedite federal review by deliberately withholding essential facts from the state courts." Id. at
260. It is vital to recall that Justice O'Connor dissented bitterly from the denial of certiorari in
another recent case, McKaskle v. Vela, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984), in which the lower courts were
reasonable enough to consider additional shortcomings in a defense attorney's performancewhen all the allegations on which the petitioner based his claim were derived from the transcript that had been before the state appellate courts on direct review.
77. Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in FederalHabeasCorpus:An Argumentfor a Return
to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1983). In my view, the more flexible approach suggested in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), decided shortly after Young, would be appropriate. Although conceding the "general rule" that federal courts should not welcome habeas
petitions in the face of available state remedies, Frisbiealso suggested that the rule could be bent
in "special circumstances." Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520-21. The Court has recently warmed to
Frisbie. E.g., Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987). I consider this a positive development.
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view, I now fault state postconviction remedies as well for enabling the Court
to be so harsh in demanding exhaustion-and for no sound reason.
By hypothesis, at the postconviction stage, federal habeas corpus litigation poses no threat to orderly state processes leading to conviction. I should
have thought, moreover, that the genuine value of involving the state appellate
courts in making and enforcing federal law is served adequately by requiring
direct review. It is difficult to discern any serious affront to the states and
their legitimate interests attending immediate federal habeas adjudication of
federal claims that remain after direct review is complete. After all, the states
established the postconviction remedies they now have primarily to discourage
prisoners' pursuit of federal relief. It is late in the day to invent outsized state
interests in postconviction litigation and on that basis to insist upon the routine exhaustion of postconviction remedies.7"

The states' minimal interest in postonviction litigation is nowhere more
plain than in cases in which state authorities themselves choose to overlook
prisoners' failure to pursue state remedies.7 9 It will come as no surprise that
state authorities tend to forego exhaustion in death penalty cases in which
state's attorneys apparently value immediate federal adjudication (and perhaps early permission to execute the petitioner) over any local interests attached to further litigation in state court. 80 I do not mean to endorse the rushto-judgment manifest in this kind of behavior or to criticize courts that quite
properly regard waivers in death penalty cases with suspicion.8' Nor do I
78. I do not overlook the codification of the exhaustion doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(c)(1982), which on its face requires petitioners attacking their convictions to exhaust "available" and "effective" state remedies and insists that exhaustion is not complete so long as prisoners have a right "by any available procedure" to raise their claims. It is well-settled that the

statute merely embraces the judge-made doctrine that preceded it and establishes no jurisdic-

tional prerequisite. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 679 (1984). The Court has often
acknowledged that its own decisions have altered habeas practice while "the statutory language
authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81
(1977); accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 548-49 n.18 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). To be
sure, the judicial innovations accomplished to date in the teeth of statutory language have typically denied business to the federal habeas courts. However, there is no good reason why statutes should be read imaginatively only in one direction.
79. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134 (apparently permitting appropriate state officials to
concede or waive compliance with the exhaustion doctrine-subject to the district court's discretion nevertheless to dismiss in favor of further litigation in state court). See Note, State
Waiver and Forfeitureof the Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas Corpus Actions, 50 U. Cm. L
REv. 354 (1983).
80. Eg., Briley v. Bass, 742 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893 (1984); Felder v.
Estelle, 693 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1982); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549 (1lth Cir. 1983) cert denied,
467 U.S. 1220 (1984), vacated in parton other grounds, Corn v. Kemp, 772 F.2d 681 (1lth Cir.
1985), vacated, Kemp v. Corn, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
81. See McGee v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 1983) (insisting that it would be
dangerous to leave the exhaustion doctrine entirely to state authorities); Westbrook v. Zant, 704
F.2d 1487, 1494 n.9 (1 lth Cir. 1983), overruledon other grounds,Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479
(1 th Cir. 1986) (holding that the federal courts are not "bound" by state attempts to waive
exhaustion). Cf. Harding v. North Carolina, 683 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1982) (refusing to allow
state authorities to waive exhaustion on the condition that federal relief is denied on the merits).
See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 136 (holding that when the warden fails to assert the exhaustion
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mean to be ad hominem in my appraisal of these goings on. It does seem fair
to point out, however, that any supposed state interests in postconviction litigation are dispelled quite readily when state authorities have an interest in

expedited adjudication on the merits.
Accordingly, the current expectation that would-be federal habeas applicants must first exhaust state postconviction remedies lacks sound justifica-

tion. A convict who has traversed trial and direct review in state court and
who then wishes to pursue federal claims in a federal forum is indistinguishable from the great mass of federal plaintiffs whose affairs are sufficiently free
of state proceedings that they are entitled to file federal lawsuits without fear

of dismissal in favor of further litigation in state court.82 By hypothesis, state
authorities have vindicated state interests in the enforcement of state criminal
law by completing a successful prosecution; any state court proceedings with

which federal habeas adjudication might conceivably interfere are at an end. 83
If, at this point, the convict wishes to launch further state court litigation by

engaging state postconviction remedies and forcing state authorities back into

state court, one should hope that the state courts will open their doors. If, by
contrast, the petitioner chooses a federal forum, the mere availability of a state
collateral procedure should pose no bar.
If potential federal petitioners are required to invoke state postconviction

remedies, federal adjudication in habeas corpus may not merely be postponed,

but thwarted altogether. Together, state postconviction remedies and the ex-

haustion doctrine drive litigants with federal claims into state court not to
protect identifiable state interests at all, but to fosterfinal state court adjudica-

tion of at least some aspects of federal claims as a substitute for federal habeas.
This conclusion is fortified by contemporaneous developments regarding the
doctrine at the district level the circuit courts should weigh a "wide variety of circumstances" in
order to decide whether the "interests of justice" would be served by addressing the merits
without further proceedings in state court); Note, The FederalInterestApproach to State Waiver
of the Exhaustion Requirement in FederalHabeas Corpus, 97 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1983) (advocating district court discretion in accepting waivers).
82. Consider Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), in which the plaintiff, who was
concretely threatened with criminal prosecution in state court but had not yet been formally
charged, was permitted immediately to pursue declaratory relief in federal court. Inasmuch as
no state proceeding was pending at the time of the federal complaint, there was no justification
(grounded in federalism or comity) to insist that the plaintiff raise federal claims in state court.
Similarly, there is no justification here for requiring a convict to exhaust state postconviction
process (in the name of federalism or comity) after state authorities have ceased state court
litigation against a would-be federal habeas petitioner.
83. It can be argued, indeed, that petitioners should not be required to exhaust even direct
review in the state appellate courts. Inasmuch as appellate review is at the insistence of the
individual concerned, rather than state authorities, a prisoner's failure to appeal cannot be said
to interfere with state court proceedings pursued affirmatively by state officials to vindicate state
interests. I accept the conventional wisdom, however, that convicts should be expected to exhaust state appellate remedies, both to allow the state courts an opportunity to correct trial
court errors and to involve the state appellate courts in the maintenance and development of
federal law. However, those explanations do not justify the current expectation that convicts
must exhaust state postconviction remedies as well.
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effect of state court fact-finding and petitioners' procedural default upon federal habeas proceedings-the subjects of the next two sections.
2. Fact-Finding
Virtually since Young was decided, the Supreme Court has protected the
integrity of fact-finding in federal habeas corpus adjudication by mandating
federal evidentiary hearings when facts alleged by the petitioner, if true, would
justify relief and the proceedings in state court were insufficient to demonstrate that the allegations cannot be sustained.84 I know of nothing that undercuts this crucial element of habeas law. In all candor, however, the Court's
recent constructions of Section 2254(d) of the Judicial Code8 ' give fact-finding
in state court far more prominence than the mandate for federal evidentiary
hearings would lead one to anticipate.8 6 The statute is not well-drafted. It
appears to instruct federal district courts to identify isolated state findings of
primary fact, which were determined after a hearing in state court and evidenced in writing, and to presume that such findings are correct-provided
they were generated by a process meeting several specified standards." The
accuracy of findings entitled to the statutory presumption may be rebutted
only by convincing evidence."3
In a series of decisions, the Court has held that: (1) direct review in the
state appellate courts may suffice for the state court "hearing" required by
Section 2254(d);8 9 (2) findings need not be expressly set forth in writing if they
can be inferred from a state court judgment entered after a hearing;9" and
(3) district courts must explain any failure to invoke the statutory presumption in favor of state findings. 9 Moreover, in a move of greater import, the
Court has meddled with the nature of the findings to which Section 2254(d) is
applicable. The Justices have acknowledged as an abstract matter that the
statute is addressed only to determinations of "primary" or "historical" fact
rather than to conclusions regarding purely "legal" issues or so-called
"mixed" questions of law and fact. 92 Yet that is where the similarity to con84. While this formulation is articulated most clearly in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963), the core idea can be traced back to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (speaking for a majority on this point).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 89-97.
87. The standards are procedural on the whole, but substantive in one respect. State findings are disentitled to the presumption if they are not supported by the record in state court. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1982).
88. At this point, the federal district court's focus shifts from a procedural appraisal of the
fact-finding process in state court to a substantive examination of the results reached in the state
forum.
89. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) [hereinafter Mata ].
90. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 430-38 (1983).
91. Mata 1, 449 U.S. at 547-52.
92. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 n.8 (1985) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 342 (1980)).
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ventional understanding ends and where the significance of fact-finding in
state postconviction proceedings assumes unexpected significance.
In conventional understanding, courts make findings of primary fact

when they describe historical events in elemental terms, engaging in a "casespecific inquiry into what happened here."9 3 Courts determine legal or mixed

issues when they judge the legal significance of historical events and come to
judgments that "imply the application of standards of law." 94 This familiar
"fact-law" distinction is not always easy to draw, and there plainly will be

room for disagreement in particular cases. 95 Yet the Court's characterizations
96
of late have been surprising, not to say startling.

The explanation for these decisions is rather obvious. The Supreme
Court, as currently constituted, prefers state court determinations of federal
claims to federal adjudication in habeas corpus and uses Section 2254(d) as a

means to that end. Without departing formally from the settled understanding that federal claims are subject to independent examination in federal
habeas, the Court undercuts the habeas jurisdiction in substance by characterizing issues that plainly are legal or mixed as, instead, factual-and thus subject to the statutory presumption. In this way, the state courts assume

significant, and largely final, decision-making authority with respect to questions that, but for such strained characterizations, would be open for federal
adjudication. 97

Indeed, the Court acknowledges as much, explaining that, in close cases,
questions may be treated as factual if the Court determines that as a matter of
"sound administration" the state courts are "better positioned" than are federal habeas corpus courts to make the necessary determination.9 8 The best

candidates are credibility choices traditionally left to the initial tribunal. The
Court has placed great emphasis upon that explanation for its decisions. 99 It

seems quite clear, however, that the Court's notion of "sound administration"
allocates much more than appraisals of demeanor evidence to the state
93. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985) (emphasis
in original).
94. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286-87 n.16 (1982) (quoting Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)). See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
95. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985); Witt, 469 U.S. at 429.
96. Questions focusing on whether a witness had an opportunity to observe the crime,
Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) [hereinafter Mata II], whether the defendant understood
the charges, Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983), whether a juror was partial, Patton v.
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), or biased, Witt, 469 U.S. 412, whether jury deliberations as a
whole were biased, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983), and whether a defendant was competent to stand trial, Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983), have all been held to be matters of
primary fact to which the statutory presumption is applicable.
97. See Spain, 464 U.S. at 131-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114-15.
99. Id. at 114-15; Witt, 469 U.S. at 428; Young, 467 U.S. at 1038; Maggio, 462 U.S. at 11718.
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courts.100
The role played by state postconviction remedies in this scheme is self-

evident-as is the explanation for the Court's insistence that those remedies be
exhausted. Would-be federal habeas petitioners raising fact-sensitive claims

are routinely diverted to state postoonviction proceedings in which the state
courts can determine "factual" issues (broadly conceived) that will then be

entitled to the statutory presumption when, and if, petitioners return to the
federal forum."' In the end, state postconviction remedies serve as substitutes
for federal habeas corpus in the adjudication of federal claims.
3. ProceduralDefault in State Court

Adjudication in state court may be better than no adjudication at all.
And it is often no adjudication at all that state postconviction remedies provide. In an extraordinary number of cases, the state courts decline to consider

federal claims because of procedural default, and the federal habeas courts,
following the Supreme Court's lead, find insufficient justification for overlooking state grounds of decision and reaching the merits.
As I explained earlier, the state postconviction remedies established in the
wake of Young typically barred claims that might have been determined at
trial or on direct review.1 "2 At the time, that limitation was devastating to the
states' ostensible objective of making prisoners' resort to federal habeas unnecessary or ineffectual. For, as the Supreme Court made clear in Fay v. Noia,10 3
procedural defaults in state court foreclosed federal habeas only if they constituted a "deliberate bypass" of state court opportunities for adjudication." °
Inasmuch as the federal "waiver" standard was rarely met, the federal courts
were routinely open to consider federal claims that were not, but might have
been, raised and adjudicated in the proceedings leading to conviction or on
appeal. 0 5 Recognizing the difficulty, the ABA Standards specified that claims

100. It should be recalled that Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Miller did not
suggest that it was easy to conclude that the voluntariness of a confession is a mixed question.
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). Justice Rehnquist actually dissented in that case.
Id. at 118-19.
101. Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982) (justifying the exhaustion doctrine in
part on the ground that the state courts may find facts entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption).
102. See supra text accompanying note 53.
103. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
104. The Court undoubtedly thought it essential to penalize at least egregious procedural
defaults merely to underscore state prisoners' obligation to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. There is also something to be said for Justice Brennan's express explanation in Noia. Albeit habeas had originated at law, the writ had long been associated with
equity, and it seemed appropriate to reserve its benefits for petitioners with "clean hands." For
my part, though, the "deliberate bypass" rule (barring some but very few federal habeas claims
because of procedural default in state court) was appended to the Noia opinion as a formal, but
insubstantial, concession to Justice Harlan, whose doubts regarding the wisdom of federal
habeas corpus were stated with feeling in dissent. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438. Cf. Hughes, Sandbagging ConstitutionalRights. Federal Habeas Corpus and the ProceduralDefault Principle, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321 (1987-88) (on the infrequency of sandbagging).
105. The Supreme Court took the same approach to claims that were not, but might have
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that had been the subject of procedural default ordinarily should not be denied
state postconviction consideration for that reason alone. 0 6 Rather, petitioners

should suffer dismissal only for an "abuse of process," meaning, in this instance, that they "knew" of their contentions at the time of trial or appeal, but

nonetheless "deliberately and inexcusably" failed to raise them. 107 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a similar rule in a revised edition
of the Uniform Act, published in 1966.108
The justification for the proposed "waiver" standard for the state courts
was clear. If the purpose of state postconviction remedies was to adjudicate

federal claims that otherwise would be pursued in federal habeas, it only made
sense that the ABA's Standards and the Uniform Act should dispose of proce-

dural defaults in the manner in which they would be treated in federal

court. 10 9 Still, the ABA Standards added a further, eminently sensible

comment:
Because of the special importance of rights subject to vindication in
post-conviction proceedings, courts should be reluctant to deny relief

to meritorious claims on procedural grounds. In most instances of
unmeritorious claims, the litigation will be simplified and expedited

if the court reaches the underlying merits despite possible procedural
flaws.io

Some jurisdictions responded admirably, opening their collateral remedies to claims that might have been raised earlier unless petitioners were found
to have deliberately bypassed state court opportunities for litigation.III Inexplicably, however, most states rejected the "waiver" test for procedural defaults. And, as expected during the 1960s when the Warren Court employed
that standard, state intransigence funneled a steady stream of state prisoners
into the federal courts.

The flow subsided in the 1970s, however, when, under the influence of the
been, put forward in prior applications for federal habeas relief. Cf. Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 15 n.8 (1963). Accordingly, state statutes allowing only one postconviction petition
and thus imposing a forfeiture sanction for any failure to assert a claim were similarly ineffectual in averting federal treatment of such claims. The Illinois statute, for example, stated that
claims omitted from an initial application were "waived" for purposes of successive applications. Inasmuch as state court treatment on the merits was foreclosed for any such omission,
regardless of the reason, the Illinois remedy in fact imposed a forfeiture-thus inviting prisoners
to seek federal habeas relief.
106. ABA STANDARDS (1968 version), supra note 51, § 6.1.
107. The ABA Standards typically employed an "abuse of process" safety valve for handling late and repetitive petitions. On the particular (and similar) question of the appropriate
disposition of petitions presenting claims omitted from a prior petition, the ABA Standards
provided for dismissal only if the petitioner committed an "abuse of process" by "deliberately
and inexcusably" withholding the claims from the prior application. Id.
108. SECOND REVISED UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § I (1966).
109. See Note, State CriminalProcedureand FederalHabeas Corpus, 80 HARV. L. REV.
422, 434 (1966).
110. ABA STANDARDS (1968 version), supra note 51, § 6.1(d).
111. E.g., Bristow v. State, 242 Md. 283, 219 A.2d 33 (1966).
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Nixon appointees, the Supreme Court abandoned the "waiver" standard for
federal habeas corpus in most instances. Then, longstanding limitations attending state postconviction remedies neatly complemented new-found restrictions on federal habeas-frustrating the litigation of prisoners' federal claims
in any forum. To cynics, it appeared that the states had finally found a way to
avoid defending state criminal convictions in federal court. No longer would
the states provide postconviction opportunities for state court litigation of federal claims in hopes that prisoners would be satisfied or that the federal courts
would approve state court judgments on the merits summarily. Now, restrictions on the availability of state remedies, in conjunction with doctrinal innovations regarding federal habeas, could prevent postconviction litigation
entirely. Wholesale procedural dismissals in both state and federal court have
now become commonplace. These days, it is the rare habeas decision that
does not rely on procedural default to dispose of at least some claims.
Others have surveyed this bleak story."1 2 It will suffice here merely to
recognize that procedural dismissals, which formerly constituted an exception
to the general rule, have become the rule, while adjudications on the merits
despite procedural default have emerged as the exception. Federal habeas
corpus is now largely closed to claims if the state courts refused, or would
refuse, to address them because of procedural default in state court of the kind
that would bar direct review in the Supreme Court.' 3 Defaulting petitioners
may have access to the federal forum only if they establish "cause" for their
failure to raise claims seasonably in state court and "prejudice" flowing from
the constitutional violations that went unchecked in state court because of
'
There is, of course, no federal interest in the enforceprocedural default. 14
ment of state procedural rules, and if the state courts disregard a petitioner's
failure to comply with state law the "cause-and-prejudice" formulation is inapposite. ' 15 In every case, then, it is essential to determine at the threshold
whether the state courts closed their doors to an applicant because of default
or would do so if asked.1 1 6 State postconviction remedies provide the obvious
112. See Hughes, supra note 104, at 321.
113. I note this last condition deliberately. It is now settled that procedural defaults that
would not establish adequate and independent state grounds of decision to cut off direct review
in the Supreme Court will not foreclose federal habeas corpus either. Harris v. Reed, 57
U.S.L.W. 4224, 4226 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1989); accord Dugger v. Adams, 57 U.S.L.W. 4276, 4279
n.6 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1989). See generally Yackle, The Reagan Administration'sHabeas Corpus
Proposals,68 IoWA L. REv. 609, 639-44 (1983). Accord, Robson & Mello, Ariadne'sProvisions
for Returning Alive from the Labyrinth of Federalism:A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricaciesof
ProceduralDefault, Adequate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida'sDeath Penalty, 76

L. REv. 87 (1988).
114. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). The
requirement that both "cause" and "prejudice" be shown has recently been relaxed a bit. In
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479 (1986), the Court said that in an "extraordinary" case in
which a constitutional violation "probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent," a federal habeas court may reach the merits in the absence of "cause."
115. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
116. This conflates a number of issues. I have argued elsewhere that the district court
should ask and determine several distinguishable questions seriatim: (1) whether, at the releCAUF.
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vehicle for making such a determination.
A familiar sequence is repeated again and again. A prisoner who seeks to
litigate a federal claim in federal court is met by a boilerplate motion to dis-

miss for failure to exhaust state remedies. 1 7 The prisoner resists dismissal on
that ground, contending that there is no currently available mechanism for
putting the claim to the state courts-not because the state courts once re-

jected the claim on the merits and will not reconsider, but because some proce-

dural default in state court resulted in a forfeiture of further state court
opportunities for litigation. 1 8 The district court finds the existing record ambiguous and notes that the general postconviction remedy in the state concerned may be open to address the claim." 9 The court thus decides the
exhaustion question against the petitioner and dismisses without prejudice to

another federal application after that remedy has been employed. The petitioner returns to state court to press the claim in state postconviction proceed-

ings, which then become the vehicle by which the state courts explicitly hold
that the petitioner committed default in prior proceedings and must suffer a

forfeiture sanction. Having now established that the state courts will not treat

the claim, the prisoner has satisfied the exhaustion doctrine and may return to

federal court. But, of course, the procedural default basis upon which state
remedies can be said to be exhausted triggers the "cause-and-prejudice" inquiry. The prisoner will almost certainly suffer dismissal yet again, this time
with prejudice. 20 Things are no different if, in the first instance, the petitioner

vant time, there was a state procedural rule requiring the petitioner to raise the claim in a
particular way or at a particular time; (2) whether, if so, the petitioner failed to comply with
that rule; and (3) whether, if the rule was violated, the state courts imposed a forfeiture sanction. Each of these is a matter of state law, such that any state court determinations in the
record are presumably authoritative. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 84 (Supp.
1988). Accord Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 54-83.
118. At least since Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963), and probably before that (see Mattox v. Sacks, 369 U.S. 656, 657 (1962)), it has been settled that the exhaustion doctrine demands
only that petitioners pursue state remedies by means available at the time they wish to apply for
federal habeas relief. Thus by asking the state courts to consider federal claims and being rebuffed on procedural default grounds, a prisoner has exhausted state remedies. See Hart, The
Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84,
112-14 (1959) (criticizing prior cases for indicating that the exhaustion doctrine required that
claims dismissed in state court because of procedural default should be dismissed as well in
federal habeas because of the petitioner's failure to exhaust state opportunities for litigation
when they were open).
119. As might be expected, the federal courts uniformly resolve doubts in favor of another
foray into state court litigation. E.g., Snethen v. Nix, 736 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1984);
Hill v. Zimmerman, 709 F.2d 232, 237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 940 (1983); Perry v.
Fairman, 702 F.2d 119, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1983). Of course, dismissal on exhaustion grounds
does keep a petitioner's claims alive, in the short run, and protects at least the possibility that
the state courts will respond favorably. Cf Goodloe v. Parratt, 605 F.2d 1041, 1049 n.20 (8th
Cir. 1979) (dismissing for want of exhaustion when the petitioner's claim seemed viable and it
was not "clear-cut" that the state courts would refuse to entertain it).
120. See Taylor v. Harris, 640 F.2d I (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981); Matias v.
Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally Spearmen v. Greer, 592 F. Supp. 69,
70 (S.D. Il1. 1984) (explaining this "no win" situation).
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avoids dismissal for want of exhaustion on the theory that, because of earlier
procedural default, the state postconviction remedy is unavailable. In that
case, the petitioner's federal action may be dismissed with prejudice immediately-unless "cause" and "prejudice" are shown. 2 '
We should hardly be surprised that prisoners who escape the exhaustion
doctrine's frying pan fall irretrievably into the procedural default doctrine's
fire. Nor should we be surprised that state postconviction remedies provide
the means by which current law often denies any judicial forum to prisoners'
federal claims. The very point of the Supreme Court's modem procedural
default cases is to identify, and to encourage the state courts to identify, procedural grounds for terminating constitutional litigation."2 Sadly, as the
Supreme Court has become less receptive to habeas petitioners who did not,
but might have, raised claims at trial or on appeal in state court, even the
professional organizations that once proclaimed the good sense of addressing
claims on the merits 2 3 have abandoned their commitment to the "waiver"
standard. The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws now propose
that petitioners' claims should be dismissed if they "inexcusably failed" to
raise them in prior proceedings; 24 the ABA, borrowing from current federal
law, suggests that petitioners "should be required to show cause" for failing to
comply with state contemporaneous objection rules.125 Procedural default
dismissals consequently become routine.126 Even states that once eschewed
such dispositions in the absence of waiver now permit state standards for judging the effect of procedural default to seek the federal level. 27 Once again,
then, state remedies fail to further the enforcement of federal law. In this
instance, indeed, they are instruments for denying opportunities for litigation
in any forum, state or federal. 2 '
121. E-g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 123 n.25 (1982). Of course, federal habeas corpus
might be foreclosed for procedural default at trial or on appeal even if my advice were taken and
prisoners were not required to exhaust state postconviction remedies. It is only that, in the
absence of postconviction litigation in state court, it may be more difficult for federal courts to
ascertain any procedural basis for refusing to treat the merits.
122. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
123. See supra text accompanying note 110.
124. UNIFORM POST-CoNVICTION PROCEDURE ACT

§ 12(b)(1)(1980).

125. ABA STANDARDS (1982 version), supra note 52, § 22-6.1(c).
126. E.g., Witt v. State, 465 So. 2d 510, 513 (Fla.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1039 (1985)
(reiterating that Florida habeas corpus is unavailable to litigate claims that "should have been
raised on appeal"); Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. 239, 240, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (1985) (refusing in
the absence of "cause" to consider claims that might have been raised on appeal); Walker v.
Kansas, 216 Kan. 1, 3-4, 530 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1975) (refusing in the absence of "exceptional
circumstances" to treat claims that might have been raised on direct review).
127. E.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978). Some people in Maryland
not only applaud this shift but advocate statutory changes that would establish even more rigid
preclusion rules for postconviction practice in that state. E-g., Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in
Maryland: Pas4 Present and Future,45 MD. L. REv. 927 (1986).
128. In what may be the most cynical development in this field in a while, some states have
recently amended their postconviction statutes to fix tight time limitations within which petitioners must file or forfeit all opportunity to litigate any claim in state court. For example,
effective January 1, 1988, Missouri means to enforce a ninety-day statute of limitations. Mo. R.
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I hope that by this time I have persuaded at least some readers that state
postconviction remedies are not all they are occasionally cracked up to be and
that litigants should be permitted to take them or leave them. Others, I dare
say, may fairly observe that my quarrel is with the Supreme Court, whose
resistance to federal habeas corpus is primarily responsible for perpetrating
the scheme I have just described. That may be so. Without discounting the
states' complicity in the objectionable state of affairs at present, I now want to
investigate the conceptual thinking that seems to drive the Supreme Court's
campaign to trim federal habeas treatment of federal claims.
II.
DEEPER DIFFICULTY

Having wrung his judicial hands over the possibility that Illinois offered
no remedy at all to prisoners in Jack Young's position, and having threatened
to hold (in due course) that such a remedy was constitutionally mandated,
Chief Justice Vinson remanded the dispute in Young v. Ragen for reconsideration by the state courts. I have described the practical effects of that disposition: the establishment of postconviction remedies in most jurisdictions. The
theoretical implications of Vinson's action are, however, something else again.
One possibility is that the states are, indeed, obligated to entertain petitions for
postconviction relief and that the disposition in Young should be understood
as a direction to Illinois to meet its constitutional responsibilities. Another is
that state postconviction remedies, if established, can and perhaps should permit the state courts to serve as the primary adjudicators of federal claims arising in state criminal cases. I will treat each of these in turn.
A.

An Aside for Constitutional Obligation

Little time and space need be spent on the question whether the states
must maintain postconviction opportunities for the litigation of federal claims,
provided the distinction I noted earlier is accepted. 129 However difficult it
may be to draw the line in practice, there is a qualitative difference between
claims that could not have been raised and litigated before the completion of
appellate proceedings and claims that were or might have been addressed at
trial or on direct review. Claims in the former category do command state
postconviction remedies. For when there was no opportunity to litigate a federal claim earlier, some postconviction vehicle is essential if litigants are to
have any access at all to a state forum. This was the constitutional evil
presented in Young itself.13 0 The proposition that the states can ignore litiCRIM. PROC., §§ 24.035(b), 29.15(b) (West Supp. 1987). I can only anticipate that the new rule
will capture a large number of unrepresented Missouri prisoners, who will attempt to file late,
suffer the forfeiture sanction, and then find themselves foreclosed in federal habeas corpus in the
absence of "cause" for their "procedural defaults."
129. See supra text accompanying note 25.
130. At least this is true to the extent that the petitioner in Young attacked the plea of
guilty entered against him. Cases in which litigants voluntarily pleaded guilty and nonetheless
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gants who seek one and only one opportunity to complain to a state tribunal

'

that they are the victims of state action in violation of the Bill of Rights condemns itself. Overbroad dicta in recent cases notwithstanding,1 37 such a proposition would have been rebuffed if it had been reached squarely in Young and

would, I trust, be rejected out of hand by the Court as it is now constituted.

The supremacy clause, 133 the well-established "right of access" to the
35
courts,134 and ordinary procedural due process considerations1 compel the
conclusion that the states must take account of constitutional objections to the
behavior of their agents.

By hypothesis, however, claims in the latter category can be raised routinely in the proceedings leading to conviction or on appeal. If that is suffi-

cient, and it seems it is, then no postconviction remedy need be established for
litigants who failed to capitalize on prior chances for state court adjudication.
This is the meaning to be attached to the Supreme Court's occasional statements that the states are not obligated to maintain general postconviction rem-

edies of the kind I have been discussing.1 36 This is not to say that the states
seek to raise antecedent constitutional claims are distinguishable since criminal defendants who
voluntarily acquiesced in their guilt chose, by hypothesis, to forego trial and appellate review
and the occasions those proceedings would have presented for litigating antecedent claims.
131. I use this term to fudge the hard question whether a state entity not formally denominated a "court" and staffed by agents not denominated "judges" can serve the constitutional
function. Cf.University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (according preclusive effect
to fact-finding by a state administrative agency).
132. Eg., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (commenting
that the states have "no obligation" to establish a collateral "avenue of relief"). Cf. United
States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (stating in a federal Section 2255
case that the Constitution "certainly does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final
judgment of conviction"). The related question whether the suspension clause makes federal
habeas corpus mandatory has long been debated. CompareJones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,
238 (1963) (citing the suspension clause as a "constitutional command") with Swain v. Pressley,
430 U.S. 372, 385 (1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (insisting that the suspension clause does
not require Congress to "provide a federal remedy for collateral review of a conviction entered
by a court of competentjurisdiction"). ComparePaschal, The Constitution and HabeasCorpus,
1970 DuKE L.J. 605 (making the case that the suspension clause requires all courts to make the
writ available) with Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgment,
38 U. CI. L. REv. 142, 170 (1970) (contending that the suspension clause protects the writ
only as it was understood at the time the Constitution was adopted).
133. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a state court may not refuse to
enforce a federal statute providing for punitive damages-at least where a similar claim under
state law would have been given effect). Cf.McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230
(1934) (standing for the anti-discrimination principle). See Note, Effect of the FederalConstitution in RequiringState Post-ConvictionRemedies, 53 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1143 (1953) (relying on
Testa in this context).
134. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (requiring the states to provide indigent
prisoners with lawyers or libraries on this basis).
135. In Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947), Justice Frankfurter cited Mooney v.
Hollohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), for the view that the states cannot deny prisoners some corrective process for unlawful detention. In Mooney, in turn, the Court relied on Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923), for the same
general proposition.
136. See supra note 132. In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the petitioner
asked the Court to hold that court-appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings must
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should not enact postconviction statutes that offer prisoners a chance to ask

for reconsideration of issues once determined against them or, more importantly, to raise claims they neglected in prior proceedings. It is to say that
such general postconviction remedies are not constitutionally mandated and
37
1
that the genuine explanation for the remand in Young lies elsewhere.

B.

State Court "Primacy"

On reflection, it seems clear that the Court decided in Young to encourage the states to establish state postconviction remedies in order to dis-

tribute judicial business as the Court itself (not the Constitution) saw fit. On
the surface, Chief Justice Vinson framed the problem at hand as one of docket

control. Complaining specifically about the volume of prisoner petitions in the
Supreme Court itself, but using language equally applicable to habeas applications in the district courts, Vinson openly campaigned for a larger role for the
state courts in postconviction litigation:
The key to the problem, as I see it, lies in the post-trial procedures and policies adopted by the states. If a state provides a well-

defined method by which prisoners can challenge their convictions,
and if their allegations are aired in open hearings, most of the
charges are either not proved or are found to be far outside the protection of the Due Process Clause. Faced with these facts, the pris-

oner sees little advantage in further appeal....

38

In this, the Chief Justice endorsed the development of state postconviction

remedies for the very purpose for which most states ultimately acted-to curb
federal habeas corpus petitions. Indeed, Vinson greeted the new Illinois PostConviction Hearing Act as a "definite" and "comprehensive" postconviction

remedy, which promised to diminish the number of petitions received by the
meet federal constitutional standards for effectiveness. The state courts had not only considered
that contention when it was raised in a successive postconviction petition but had held for the
petitioner on the point. Finley, 481 U.S. at 554. Moreover, the state courts were perfectly
prepared to consider the underlying claims that the petitioner insisted counsel should have
raised in the petitioner's initial postconviction petition. Id. So the Finley case was not one in
which the state courts were closed entirely to any federal claim. Nor was United States v.
MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976), such a case. There, the federal Section 2255 movant sought a
transcript of his criminal trial in the hope of discovering error. That claim, and any other
claims that a perusal of the transcript might have disclosed, were or would have been cognizable
on direct review or in federal collateral proceedings.
137. The Court has said repeatedly that even appellate review is open to convicts at the
option of the state concerned, rather than as a matter of constitutional right. E.g., Finley, 481
U.S. at 556-57. Here again, however, I take it to be assumed that there was an opportunity to
put federal claims to the trial court. Cf.Note, State Court Withdrawal From Habeas Corpus,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 1081 (1966) (assuming that the states need not offer litigants more than one
opportunity to litigate federal claims and defending states that might choose to expend resources in other ways and leave collateral adjudication to federal habeas).
138. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 S. Ct. v, viii (ABA Address, Sept. 7, 1949).
But see Friendly, supra note 132, at 167-69 (insisting that disappointed petitioners may not
cease their efforts and may press on to the federal forum).
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federal courts from inmates in that state.13 9
A decade and a half later, similar sentiments were voiced in a second
edition of Young, Case v. Nebraska."4 By 1965, many states had established
postconviction remedies in response to the Supreme Court's pleas. In Case,
however, it appeared that another prisoner had been denied any process
whatever for adjudicating a claim that his guilty plea was invalid for want of
Certiorari was granted to decide whether the fourprofessional counseling.'
teenth amendment mandated "some adequate corrective process" by which
state prisoners might litigate federal claims, and another academic, Daniel
Meador, was appointed to make the affirmative argument.1 42 As often happens, the issue in Case itself was diffused in the eleventh hour when the Nebraska Legislature enacted a new postconviction statute and the Supreme
Court, on that account, remanded to the state courts for reconsideration in
light of changed circumstances. Counsel's argument, however, together with
the reaction from Justices Clark and Brennan, who attached concurring opinions, casts considerable light on the thinking of the times.
Professor Meador dutifully urged the Court to proclaim that the states
were constitutionally obligated to provide postconviction remedies to convicts.
Recognizing the significance of the new law in Nebraska, he nonetheless insisted that the Court should avoid yet another ambiguous disposition like the
one in Young and should instead make the states' responsibilities clear. In
this, however, Meador rested not on the relevant constitutional bases cited in
brief, but on "sound principles of federalism." 1 4 3 He reminded the Court of
its innovative criminal procedure decisions of late and its related decisions
expanding the scope of federal habeas corpus for the adjudication of federal
claims. Already, in his telling, those precedents had generated a "vast increase" in the number of habeas corpus petitions fied in the federal courts.'"
If the federal courts were not to be drawn "increasingly into state criminal
administration," Meador contended, then the states must make their own
courts more available for the determination of newly announced federal
45
safeguards.1
Meador's approach to the issue in Case embodied an implicit criticism of
recruiting the lower federal courts to enforce federal procedural standards applicable to state criminal prosecutions. Given that the Constitution must be
enforced somewhere, the sheer number of petitions raising federal claims
made no argument regarding the allocation of business between state and fed139. Vinson, supra note 138, at viii.
140. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
141. The prisoner's state habeas petition was filed a month after Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
142. Professor Meador, of course, did not limit himself to the fourteenth amendment but
relied on supremacy clause precedents as well.
143. Case, 381 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring).

144. Id.
145. Id.
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eral courts of concurrent jurisdiction. To complain that the federal courts
were flooded with petitions was to assume in the first instance that the state
courts constituted a preferred forum. It is hardly surprising that a preference
for the state courts should have been embraced in the mid-Sixties. Many
respected observers at the time, including Professor Meador, doubted the wisdom of making federal habeas do service as a collateral remedy.14 6 Justice
Clark, who had dissented in Fay v. Noia and the other great habeas decisions
in 1963,147 could be expected to respond favorably. Clark wrote separately in
Case to acknowledge the "tremendous increase" in federal petitions and, like
Chief Justice Vinson before him, to insist that the "practical answer" to the
"problem" lay in the enactment of state postconviction remedies permitting
prisoners to "air out" their federal claims in state court. 148 The establishment
of such remedies, according to Justice Clark, would both temper the "rising
conflict" between the state and federal courts and "relieve" the latter of an
"ever-increasing burden."' 4 9
It is surprising, however, that Justice Brennan, the architect of the Warren Court's innovations in Noia, should have stood for any of this. 1 0 But the
fact is, he did. He wrote:
The desirability of minimizing the necessity for resort by state
prisoners to federal habeas corpus is not to be denied. Our federal
system entrusts the States with primary responsibility for the administration of their criminal laws. The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Supremacy Clause make requirements of fair and just procedures
an integral part of those laws, and state procedures should ideally
include adequate administration of these guarantees as well. If, by
effective corrective processes, the States assumed this burden, the exhaustion requirement.., would clearly promote state primacy in the
implementation of these guarantees. Of greater importance, it would
assure not only that meritorious claims would generally be vindi146. See D.

MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA

(1966); Meador, The Im-

pact of FederalHabeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures,52 VA. L. REV. 286 (1966). In the
years since Case, Professor Meador has acquiesced in a significant federal role in the enforcement of federal safeguards but has championed a specially designed system for appellate review
of state judgments at the circuit level, as opposed to the district courts' current habeas jurisdiction. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); Meador, StraighteningOut FederalReview of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273 (1983).
147. See supra notes 103-05.
148. Case, 381 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1965).
149. Id. at 340. Justice Clark noted the current "public agitation and debate" over proposals to limit the federal habeas jurisdiction but insisted that the reasons given for legislative
action would not "survive careful scrutiny." Id. at 339. On prior occasions, he had not been so
protective of federal habeas. Exasperated by the Court's decision in Noia, Clark hinted that,
while he had previously opposed proposals to overrule Brown v.Allen legislatively, he had come
to believe that legislation might be the only means of restoring habeas corpus to its "proper
place in the judicial system." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963).
150. See also Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961).
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cated without any need for federal court intervention, but that nonmeritorious claims would be fully ventilated, making easier the task
of the federal judge if the state prisoner pursued his cause further.... Greater finality would inevitably attach to state court de-

terminations of federal constitutional questions, because further
on federal habeas corpus would . . . prove
evidentiary hearings
51
unnecessary.1

These points are controversial to say the least. One certainly can deny
that it is desirable to channel state prisoners away from the federal courts for
the adjudication of federal claims. While "[o]ur federal system" surely does
assign responsibility for the enforcement of state substantive criminal law to
state authorities, it is far from clear that federally guaranteed procedural safeguards form part of that state criminal law, such that they, too, should be
addressed authoritatively by the state courts. The exhaustion doctrine hardly
manifests any such understanding. Congress has assigned the determination
of federal claims to the lower federal courts sitting in habeas, and the exhaustion doctrine merely postpones federal adjudication until the state courts have
completed their work in order to avoid interference with state processes. 5 If
the object of the federal system is to "promote state primacy," it is only in the
literal sense that the state courts are first in line to hear litigants' contentions.
State court determinations are not given preclusive effect, however. The very
point of establishing the federal courts' power to make their own, posterior
determinations is to ensure that controlling authority is not lodged with the
state courts but rather in a federal tribunal. Nor is exhaustion meant to generate complete state court records to facilitate summary federal dispositions of
meritless claims,"5 3 albeit that may occur in some instances.'- 4
It seems that Justice Brennan was beguiled in Case by the facile premise
on which counsel's arguments were grounded: that ceteris paribus the state
courts are the primary dispute-resolution institutions in this society and that
the federal courts have only a residual role, even with respect to federal constitutional issues. The "primacy" of the state courts in this substantive sense is
seductive. Indeed, Justice Brennan bowed to it during the very period in
which he and other members of the Warren Court were forging an expansive
jurisdiction for the federal habeas courts. Yet it was impossible to have it both
ways-to insist at one and the same time that state courts had principal responsibility for the enforcement of federal procedural rights and that state
prisoners were entitled to seek authoritative judgments from the federal district courts. Today, of course, the Court discerns the tension between committing federal issues to the state courts and a muscular form of federal
adjudication in habeas corpus. And a newly minted majority of the Justices
151.
152.
153.
154.

Case, 381 U.S. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes
Yackle, supra note 77.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
See supra note 101.

omitted).
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increasingly attempts to ameliorate that tension by foreclosing federal habeas
whenever possible.155
To critique these unfortunate developments, it is necessary to trace the
intellectual conflict embedded in Justice Brennan's statements in Case to its
conceptual roots and to challenge the jurisprudential framework that is uncovered. I want to set these tasks for the remainder of this essay.
C. Conceptual Underpinnings

The notion that the state courts are the chief dispute-resolution institutions in American society, irrespective of the nature of the legal claims in issue, rests upon what may be called the "process model" in western
jurisprudence. Within Austinian tradition, coercive governmental orders are
to be respected, unless the body responsible for them fails either to respect
legal restrictions on its power or to employ adequate procedures in coming to
its decisions. 5 6 Attacks upon governmental outcomes, then, are recast as
challenges to the process by which results are generated.
The process model is enormously appealing in the liberal state inasmuch
as it maintains at least a surface neutrality." 7 What might have been straightforward confrontations over substantive choices are submerged in investigations of process. Governmental power is limited by dispersal according to
presumed institutional competencies-on a variety of levels. In the separation-of-powers context, legislatures, said to be well-suited to policy formulation, are assigned the task of adapting legal arrangements to new
circumstances; courts, better equipped to engage in the reasoned elaboration
of rules, are assigned responsibility for adjudicating disputes.'5 8 Within the
realm of dispute-resolution, judicial decisions are acceptable so long as the
manner in which they are generated meets established standards that ensure
judicial capacity to engage in fair and accurate decision-making.
About the time that Young and Case were decided, influential theorists at
Harvard seized upon the process model as a generally applicable framework
for the legal order. In their widely read teaching materials, made available in
mimeograph form in 1958, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks pressed upon stu155. See supra text accompanying notes 102-28.

156. H.L.A. HART,

THE CONCEPT OF LAW

64-69 (1961) (elaborating on the "legal limita-

tions" on sovereign power); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86-88 (1971) (explaining the
model of "pure procedural justice" in liberal thought). For a constitutional analogue, see J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); cf. Lyons, Substance, Process, and Outcome in Constitutional Theory, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 745 (1987) (examining the process model embedded in
Ely's work).
157. See S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM
7 (1984) (restating liberalism's disbelief in the objectivity of values). But see Dworkin, Liber-

alism, in

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY

113 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978) (distinguishing Ameri-

can "liberalism" from American "conservatism").
158. See M. KELMAN, A CRITICAL GUIDE TO

L. KALMAN,
CALIF.

L.

LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:

REV.

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

186-90 (1987);

1927-1960, 22 (1986); Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76

465, 505 (1988).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

1987-88]

STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES

dents a "principle of institutional settlement," which embodied the proposition that "decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established
procedures... ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless
and until they are duly changed."' 5 9 Thus generations of law students at
Harvard and elsewhere were offered the process model as society's chief means
of contending with governmental power-by allocating its exercise to the institutions best suited to use it wisely.
When Hart and Herbert Wechsler turned their considerable talents to
writing their great casebook on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they invoked the process model to explain, and in some instances to prescribe, the
orchestration of relations between the federal and state courts.16 In a system
in which two coordinate sets of courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction in most
cases arising under federal law, it makes some sense to fashion a principled
basis for distributing business between them.1 61 Hart and Wechsler met the
challenge methodically. They noted that the states preexisted the Constitution
and that local authorities can and are expected to make public policy in the
ordinary exercise of their police power. Indeed, whatever positive law exists
for the ordering of human affairs is largely traceable to the common law of the
states as augmented by affirmative policy-making by state legislatures. The
federal legislative power, by contrast, is in theory limited to the matters enumerated in Article I, such that federal enactments are by nature interstitialfragments sprinkled over the body of state law in places in which there is some
justification for federal standards. 162 In a like manner, the state courts, exercising a general jurisdiction owed to state law, are the routine mechanisms for
the resolution of disputes, while the federal courts are available only in the
exceptional instances specified in Article III-and then only when Congress
enacts implementing legislation. 63
Once the landscape is viewed in this way, it is a short step to the proposition that the state courts are the tribunals of choice even for federal issues.
Those courts, too, are sworn to uphold the Constitution, and their judgments
regarding federal questions are entitled to respect. Hart made the point explicitly in his famous dialogue on the federal courts' role: "In the scheme of
the Constitution, [the state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitu159. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROcEss 4 (tent. ed. 1958).
160. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

(1953).

161. It is not, of course, essential to do so. The choice of forum can simply be left to the
litigants concerned. That, indeed, is what most federal jurisdictional statutes seem on their face
to contemplate.
162. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 160, IntroductoryNote: The InterstitialCharacterofFederalLaw, at 435; see also, eg., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 556-57

(1940).
163. H. HART & H WECHSLER, supra note 160, at 18 (ascribing to the Constitutional

Convention a clear decision to give the lower federal courts only a limited purview, subject to
still further limitations at the discretion of Congress).
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tional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones."'' 64 Ten years
later, Paul Bator elaborated the same theme in the context of federal habeas
corpus-influencing not only the arguments put forward in Case, but, unfortunately, more recent decisions undercutting the availability of the federal
writ.

16 5

Professor Bator's article is well known, and I will give it only brief and
oversimplified treatment here. 16 6 Essentially, Bator posits that substantive
criminal law is ordinarily the business of state government and that, accordingly, criminal defendants are routinely haled into state court to answer
charges. At that critical juncture, when the power of the state is arrayed
against the individual, the Bill of Rights mediates the conflict to ensure fundamental fairness and to achieve results in which society may have genuine confidence. Federal law, then, specifies some basic rules under which state courts
must operate as they set about their task of enforcing state substantive law.
These federally guaranteed safeguards are and should be enforced by the state
courts themselves as an adjunct to the substantive decision at hand: the determination of guilt or innocence. If state trial courts make mistakes with respect
to federal issues, their errors may be corrected on direct review in the state
appellate courts or in the Supreme Court of the United States. At least, Bator
insists, there is no justification for believing that the lower federal courts are
better adjudicators of constitutional questions, such that they have warrant to
substitute their views for those of the state courts concerned.
According to the process model Bator has in mind, federal and state
judges are fungible with respect to their ability to determine federal issues. It
is essential, by hypothesis, that some court should be open to decide federal
questions arising in state criminal prosecutions, and in the ordinary course
that will be a state court. It is wholly unnecessary, and, indeed, counterproductive, for any other court, save an appellate court on direct review, to
determine the same issues-redundantly pawing the same ground with no basis for believing that a second judgment will be an improvement on the first.
The lower federal courts have a role to play only in rare circumstances in
which state processes break down, such that criminal defendants who wish to
164. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953). The dialogue was reproduced in the
Hart and Wechsler casebook. While I am convinced that my treatment in the text accurately
portrays the casebook's view of the relative place of the state and federal courts, I hasten to add
that this broad language from the dialogue comes at the conclusion of Hart's treatment of
Congress' power to deny litigants with federal claims any entitlement to litigate those claims in
afederal court. Inasmuch as Hart concluded that Congress could eliminate any such forum in
at least a class of cases, he was understandably pressed to offer the state courts as an available
alternative. Otherwise, substantive constitutional claims would have no forum at all. Having
seized upon the state courts in reserve, however, Hart flipped his discussion of the federal courts
on end by promoting the state courts as the primary tribunals for federal claims and edging the
federal courts into the background.
165. Bator, supra note 15.
166. I have dealt with Bator's thesis more thoroughly elsewhere. Yackle, Explaining
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1014-19 (1985).
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raise Bill of Rights issues have no fair opportunity to pursue them in the
course of state court proceedings. By this account, the states should provide
procedurally satisfying opportunities for the litigation of federal claims in state
court in order to avoid federal adjudication in habeas corpus-just as Chief
Justice Vinson in Young, and Justices Clark and Brennan in Case,
recommended.
D. Conceptual Conflict
To locate the process model behind the encouragement and growth of
state postconviction remedies is to identify internal inconsistency in the
Supreme Court's initial approach to postconviction litigation generally. For at
the very time the Court was promoting state remedies in the way I have just
described, the Justices were proclaiming the availability of federal habeas
corpus for the adjudication of federal claims. The idea driving Brown v. Allen167 in 1953 and certainly Fay v. Noial 8 in 1963 was that convicts with
federal claims are routinely entitled to at least one opportunity to litigate those
claims in a federal forum, usually federal habeas corpus, whether or not the
state courts addressed the merits in a procedurally satisfying manner.
The tension between this proposition and the process model is manifest
everywhere, but particularly in connection with the exhaustion doctrine. The
process model understands the problem at hand to be how best to prosecute
state criminal actions, with attention to both state and federal legal issues that
may arise. Since criminal defendants will routinely be called to account in
state court in the first instance, and since it is settled that they must exhaust
state opportunities for litigating federal defenses, it only makes sense that the
answers the state courts give to federal questions should suffice-provided the
process in state court is adequate.169 The leading Warren Court decisions, by
contrast, understand the issue as how best to ensure that litigants with federal
claims have access to a federal forum. The very statement of the exhaustion
doctrine as the general expectation that would-be federal petitioners must pursue state judicial remedies before applying for federal relief signifies that the
federal courts have the last word (in both senses of the term) on the meaning
of federal law. Professor Bator himself has acknowledged that his approach to
habeas corpus was squarely rejected in Noia.17 °
The Warren Court, too, recognized the need to allocate business between
the state and federal courts and the apparent utility of making the state courts
the primary adjudicators of federal claims (in both senses of that term). Yet
the Justices then sitting insisted that the federal habeas courts must be open
for the litigation of federal claims-should litigants wish to use them. Any
167.
168.
169.
170.

344 U.S. 443 (1953). See supra text accompanying note 14.
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Bator, supra note 15.
Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. &

MARY

L

REv. 605, 613 n.24 (1981). See Resnik, Tiers, 57 So. CALIF. L. REV. 840, 877-84 (1984) (examining the assumptions underlying Noia).
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interjurisdictional friction that might result would simply have to be tolerated.
In part at least, the Court's commitment to federal adjudication can be explained as a fair interpretation of the will of Congress embodied in the Habeas
Corpus Act, as a reflection of the federal courts' historic role in the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment, and as a recognition of their independence
and special competence in Bill of Rights matters. 171 In my view, moreover, it
would be dangerous to accept state court judgments as authoritative when
those courts have operated under conflicting duties-both to enforce state sub-

stantive criminal law and to respect
federal procedural safeguards designed to
17 2
make that task more difficult.

On the surface, the current intellectual unsettlement arising from the process model appears to track the political divisions within the Supreme Court.
Some of the Justices appointed in recent years by Presidents Nixon and Rea-

gan plainly reject the Warren Court's enthusiasm for the adjudication of federal claims in federal court. Predictably, they find the process model useful in
advancing their hopes of channeling litigation into the state forum. And they
increasingly rely on that model, both with respect to habeas corpus 173 and in
other, related contexts.174 Justice Brennan and others of similar mind, by contrast, now seem to recognize more fully the process model's implications and

thus resist its application in most instances. 175

A bit deeper lies paradox. One would expect that the process model's
adherents would insist upon sound state procedures in order to strengthen the

case for relying on state adjudication to the exclusion of federal review. And it
would seem that those who champion federal litigation would be less demanding of the states-in contemplation that litigants will have an opportunity to
litigate in federal court in due course. Yet the reverse is true. The Justices

who invoke the process model to explain decisions foreclosing federal litigation tend in the next breath to find the most primitive state procedures sufficient 17 6 and reject out of hand efforts to improve those procedures by
171. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
172. Yackle, supra note 166.
173. The obvious habeas illustration is Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See Resnik,
supra note 170, at 895. On the other hand, several observers have explained that case on other
grounds. E.g., Halpern, FederalHabeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v.
Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1982). See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court- An
Examination of Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 456-59
(1980) (contending that Stone responds to several themes evident in criticisms of the Warren
Court). Professor Saltzburg considers Stone to be primarily a case about the exclusionary rule.
Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 388-90
(1983). That has also been my own view. Yackle, The Reagan Administration'sHabeas Corpus
Proposals,68 IOWA L. REV. 609, 623-28 (1983).
174. I have found traces of the process model in cases on preclusion, e.g., Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), and equitable restraint, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415 (1979). See Yackle, supra note 166.
175. E.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 515-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. E.g., Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481 (stating in dictum that "state proceedings need do no
more than satisfy the minimal procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause" in order to be given preclusive effect in federal court).
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constitutional means. 177 Only the Justices who contend that the federal courts
should be more open to federal claims seem at all committed to making state
proceedings genuinely "full and fair." 178 There is, of course, an ideological
explanation for all this. The Court's "conservatives" may simply be hostile to
the claims that litigants wish to press in any court and thus squeeze from both
ends at once-forcing petitioners out of federal court on the promise of state
process while at the same time signaling the state courts that most anything
they do will suffice. 17 9 The Court's "liberals," by contrast, may be so solici-

tous of federal claims that they wish to make the most of all available ltigational opportunities. I need not pass on the validity of explanations along
these lines. It is enough for my purposes to recall that, when the Court encouraged the development of state postconviction remedies in Case, Justices of
quite different ideological stripes rested upon the genuine process model put
forward by Professor Meador. 8 ' That reliance, I have tried to show, was
misplaced in light of contemporaneous decisions promoting federal habeas
corpus. And to the extent the process model continues to influence thinking
to this day, it generates only confusion and, I fear, erodes the Warren Court's
great promise that petitioners with federal claims are entitled to a federal opportunity to litigate them.
CONCLUSION

I have labored longer than I intended-in order to announce and defend
the view that would-be federal habeas corpus petitioners should not be asked
to exhaust state postconviction remedies before applying for federal relief. I
have advanced two arguments. First, the postconviction remedies now available in most states do not further and, indeed, often foil the adjudication of
federal constitutional claims. Second, the process model, on which the
Supreme Court has relied in insisting upon the exhaustion of state postconviction remedies, conflicts with the general proposition, embodied in the Warren
Court's habeas cases, that litigants with federal claims are entitled to a federal
forum at some point. I have not suggested that state postconviction remedies
should be denied to litigants who wish to invoke them. Nor have I proposed
that a reduction in their use would eliminate all, or even many, flaws in current federal habeas law. On the contrary, I have ascribed the vexing frustrations that still beset federal habeas corpus to the Supreme Court's inability or
177. Kg., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 455 (1987) (refusing to hold appointed counsel
in state postconviction proceedings to a federal standard of effectiveness).
178. E.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined
by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (arguing that various "conditions" should be satisfied before state
judgments are accorded preclusive effect).
179. There is also an argument from federalism. Justices who are concerned with federal
evaluation of state court behavior of any kind may sense that the process model is actually more
threatening to those courts than is independent federal adjudication. For the state courts may
well resent examinations of their processes more than they resist appraisals of their substantive
results. See Resnik, supra note 170, at 886 n.157.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46, 154-55.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. XVI:35i9

unwillingness to keep faith with the conceptual thinking on which the Warren
Court's great habeas decisions were grounded.
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